Richard W. Stewart, retired Colonel, has newly released a book, “Combat Historian” (Collecting and Writing American Special Operations History from Desert Storm to Afghanistan 1991-2002). His book answers the question, “Why did I become a historian at all, let alone a combat historian.” That’s all he ever wanted to be (except briefly when he flirted with being a veterinarian or an astronaut as so many children did in the 60s). 

Stewart wanted to “understand why the human race does what it does and how it has gotten to where it is today.”

Stewart studied history and worked toward a reserve commission and wasn’t sure how he could combine the two professional inclinations. After continuing with graduate education and facing a poor job market at the time he noticed a position for a civilian historian serving in the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL).

“The value of history is self-evident to historians but less to many command and staff officers.”

—Richard W. Stewart

Stewart’s book traces the evolving role of combat historians from World War II through 1990. The book takes the reader through the challenges of translating experience and lessons learned into the training and doctrinal base of the Army. He found the compilation of a historical record often took a back seat to other priorities such as press releases, quick turnaround lessons  and other more immediate priorities rather than lessons learned for the future. 

Stewart explains, “The value of history is self-evident to historians but less to many command and staff officers.” But he explains the penalty may be down range, like the impact of a chemical agent. We need to know where the units were and on what day. A combat historian embedded in a unit can do a great deal of good capturing what really happened.”

“In many cases the officers had never met a historian and didn’t know why we were there and tried to let facts fall where they may.” He adds some were surprised but were quite willing to talk as long as they knew it was legitimate. Almost all of the support persons were very interested in talking about what they did and how they helped the battle go successfully.

Record keeping was another issue. He says many didn’t understand the importance of accurate data; it was at the bottom of their priority list. There was no requirement to keep data and no penalty for failing to do it. Stewart explains computers would seem to make it easy to keep records but it might seem too much work to do, and they thought they had other things more important.

And as he learned, truth can have its costs and risks in an organization where commanders sometimes sought the road of protecting their units versus welcoming the information gleaned by the combat historians. Sometimes he says he wasn’t allowed to provide the specific proof of facts behind the observations because it could lead to hurt feelings. “Personality and prejudice overrode regulations and perhaps reason.”

He faced reluctant officers who tried to avoid having the observations of the historian reflect negatively on their units. There were the complications of the new joint command as well as the challenge of getting the new historian program institutionalized into the Army so that units would cooperate in providing information. In addition, at a time when resources were tight, “and the fight for positions and resources was cutthroat” a historian position was viewed as expendable. But what really happened should be number one priority to figure out if there is a better way to do things.”

Stewart, the long-time Chief Historian for the U.S. Army, has been working on his book for four years.  

“I had to figure a way to get my memories in order. It took two years to write it and get the pictures in order and another two years for the final draft.”

“I truly felt that I was a ‘servant of forever,’ since my historical interviews, document collections, and written insights had captured data that other historians could use for decades to come. I captured personal stories as well as official facts and documents. I hope that I helped put a human face on stories of special operations planning and combat.”

https://blog.stetson.edu/faculty-engagement/2012/01/